

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

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INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 3205

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: OPTION III DRAFT GUIDANCE SUPPLEMENT

REF: STATE 179343

B. MBFR VIENNA 314

C. USNATO 3493 DTG 281250Z JUN 1975

D. STATE 152142

1. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES FURTHER MISSION VIEWS ON THE SUPPLEMENT TO DRAFT GUIDANCE TO THE AHG AND OUTLINES SUGGESTED TEXT WHICH TAKES INTO ACCOUNT REF BA AND AS WELL AS ISSUES OUTLINED IN REF C.

2. AS STATED IN REF C, WE FAVOR GIVING THE SPC THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THE GUIDANCE CIRCULATED BY THE U.S. ON 26 JUNE AND TO SUPPLEMENT IT ONLY TO THE EXTENT NECESSARY TO OBTAIN ALLIED AGREEMENT. IF THE U.S. WERE TO PREPARE A SEPARATE PAPER INCLUSIVE ENOUGH TO STAND ON ITS OWN WE COULD BE INVITING PARALLEL TREATMENT OF A NUMBER  
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OF SUBJECT AREA S IN ADDITION TO THOSE COVERED IN THE REF  
B TEXT.

3. FOR THIS REASON WE RECOMMEND THAT THE GUIDANCE AND SUPPLEMENT

BE VIEWED AS A SINGLE DOCUMENT AND THAT MATERIAL BE INCORPORATED IN THE SUPPLEMENT GENERALLY UNDER THE DISCUSSION HEADINGS ALREADY FAMILIAR TO THE SPC-CONTENT, OBJECTIVES, LIMITATIONS, AND AIR MANPOWER. WE BELIEVE THIS SHOULD KEEP TO A MINIMUM THE RANGE OF TOPICS FOR WHICH SUPPLEMENTAL LANGUAGE WILL HAVE TO BE AGREED.

4. REQUEST WASHINGTON APPROVAL OF FOLLOWING ILLUSTRATIVE DRAFT OF ADDITIONAL ASPECTS OF THE ALLIED POSITION ON WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. NUCLEAR ELEMENTS IN MBFR FOR USE AS MAY BE REQUIRED IN THE SPC AND THE CAUCUS DISCUSSIONS. WE WOULD APPRECIATE COMMENTS ON, OR APPROVAL OF ANY OF THE LETTERED PARAGRAPHS BELOW AS SOON AS AVAILABLE.

BEGIN TEXT:

A. THE FOLLOWING INTERNAL ALLIED AGREEMENTS ON ADDITIONAL ASPECTS OF THE NATO POSITION SUPPLEMENT THE FOREGOING GUIDANCE.

CONTENT

B. IN REACHING THESE UNDERSTANDINGS THE ALLIES HAVE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT THE VIEWS OF SHAPE EXPRESSED IN (DESIGNATION OF DOCUMENT) AND CONCLUDED THAT THE CONTENT OF THE NUCLEAR OFFER IS SUCH THAT FOLLOWING ITS NEGOTIATION NATO WOULD RETAIN THE CAPABILITY TO MAINTAIN A CREDIBLE MILITARY POSTURE. ADEQUATE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD BE AVAILABLE AFTER THE PROPOSED PHASE I REDUCTIONS TO REMAIN A VISIBLE SYMBOL OF THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO PROVIDE FOR THE NUCLEAR DEFENSE OF NATO. SUFFICIENT WEAPONS WOULD REMAIN READILY AVAILABLE IN EUROPE TO RAPIDLY MEET WARSAW PACT CONVENTIONAL OR NUCLEAR ATTACK. DETERRENCE WOULD REMAIN UNIMPAIRED. (COMMENT: WE WOULD DRAW ON PARAGRAPH 15 OF THE U.S. VIEWS PAPER IF REQUIRED; SEE PARA 5A, REF C).

C. THE 1,000 NUCLEAR WARHEADS WILL BE WITHDRAWN FROM AMONG THOSE AVAILABLE FOR USE BY U.S. UNITS. WITHDRAWALS WILL BE CARRIED OUT IN SUCH A MANNER THAT A SUBSTANTIAL CAPABILITY WILL BE MAINTAINED IN ALL EMPLOYMENT MODES. THE TYPES AND  
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NUMBERS OF EACH TYPE OF WARHEAD TO BE WITHDRAWN WILL NOT BE SPECIFIED TO THE EAST. (ADDITIONAL MATERIAL IF REQUIRED: WARHEADS WHICH BECOME AVAILABLE DUE TO PLANNED REDUCTION OR PHASEOUT OF AN ALLIED NUCLEAR SYSTEM (E.G., HONEST JOHN AND SERGEANT) AND NO LONGER CONSIDERED PART OF A POC WOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR POSSIBLE INCLUSION AMONG THE U.S. NUCLEAR WARHEADS OFFERED FOR REDUCTION.) (SEE PARA 5B, REF C.))

D. THE CONTENT OF THE OFFER TO WITHDRAW U.S. NUCLEAR ELEMENTS IS INTENDED AS A UNIQUE TRADE TO OBTAIN THE NATO PHASE I OBJECTIVES. (SEE PARA 5E, REF C.)

II. OBJECTIVES

E. (THE BRITISH TABLED PRECISE LANGUAGE (IN THE JUNE 30 SPC DISCUSSION OF DRAFT GUIDANCE, REPORTED SEPTEL) FOR FURTHER DEFINING THE COMMON CEILING COMMITMENT IN PHASE I. WHILE THE UK LANGUAGE APPEARS UNACCEPTABLE, IT PROVIDES A BASIS FOR SPC DEVELOPMENT OF A POSSIBLE COMPROMISE ON GUIDANCE. WE EXPECT THAT BOTH CHANGED GUIDANCE AND SUPPLEMENTAL TEXT WILL BE REQUIRED FOR THIS TOPIC. REQUEST FURTHER GUIDANCE.)

F. THE ALLIES SHOULD CONTINUE TO SEEK WITHDRAWAL OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY IN MAJOR UNITS INCLUDING THEIR ARMAMENTS BUT SHOULD REQUIRE WITHDRAWAL AND LIMITATION ONLY OF SOVIET AND TANKS. (SEE PARA 5H, REF C).

### III. LIMITATION

G. THE ALLIANCE SHOULD AVOID ANY COMMITMENT TO LIMITS ON NON-U.S. ARMAMENTS. BECAUSE OF THE GREATER IMPORTANCE OF AVOIDING LIMITATIONS ON NON-U.S. NATO ARMAMENTS, THE ALLIES SHOULD NOT SEEK LIMITATION ON NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT ARMAMENTS. (SEE PARA 5I, REF C.)

H. (SEE PARA 5J, REF C. WASHINGTON GUIDANCE REGARDING FURTHER EXPLANATION TO THE ALLIES OF THE TERM IN SUCH A WAY AS TO UNDERMINE THE BASIS OF THE AGREEMENT WOULD GO HERE, IF NECESSARY. TO BE USEFUL IN GAINING AGREEMENT TO NAC GUIDANCE SUCH EXPLANATION SHOULD SPECIFY IN WHAT WAY AND HOW FAR THE ALLIANCE SHOULD BE WILLING TO GO IN ACCEPTING LIMITS  
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ON U.S. TANKS AND IN REQUIRING LIMITS ON SOVIET NUCLEAR SYSTEMS).

I. (THE PROBLEM OF DEPLOYMENT AND REINFORCEMENT OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS IN EUROPE IN AREAS OUTSIDE THE NGA HAS ARISEN AND MAY BE BROUGHT UP AGAIN. WE WILL TRY TO AVOID DISCUSSIONS OF NON-CIRCUMVENTION UNTIL AFTER OPTION III IS APPROVED. REQUEST GUIDANCE.) (SEE PARA K, REF C.)

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J. THE ALLIES SHOULD AVOID ANY PROVISIONS IN AN AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD INHIBIT QUALITATIVE IMPORVEMENTS OR ONE-FOR-ONE REPLACEMENT OF CONSTRAINED SYSTEMS WITH FOLLOW-ON SYSTEMS.

K. THE ALLIED WILL AVOID ANY LIMITATION ON U.S. CONVENTIONAL (I.E.N NON-NUCLEAR) COMBAT AIRCRAFT. THE ALLIES WOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THE OFFER TO WITHDRAW U.S. AIRCRAFT IS LIMITED TO "U.S. NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT", WHICH WOULD BE DEFINED TO BE ALL AIRCRAFT OF SPECIFIED MODELS (I.E., F4-C, F4-D, F4-E) IN THE AREA, IF AT LEAST SOME AIRCRAFT OF THAT MODEL ARE PHYSICALLY CAPABLE OF DELIVERING A NUCLEAR WEAPON WITHOUT FURTHER MODIFICATION. THE ALLIES WOULD WANT THE NEGOTTIATING RECORD TO REFLECT INSOME WAY THE MODELS COVERED BY THE LIMITATION. THIS COULD BE IN THE FORM OF A LIST OF MODELS WHICH BOTH SIDES AGREE ARE COVERED OR IT COULD TAKE SOME OTHER FORM. THE LIMIT OF U.S. NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT WOULD BE A LIMIT ON THE OVERALL RESIDUAL TOTAL OF SUCH AIRCRAFT IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THERE WOULD BE NO SUB-SECRET

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CEILINGS ON PARTICULAR NUCLEAR-CAPABLE MODELS.

L. SOVIET "MAIN BATTLE TANKS," WOULD BE DEFINED BY THOSE MODELS (E.G., T-54, T-62, T-10) NOW IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THE LIMITATION WILL ASLSO COVER OTHER MODELS SUCH AS THE T-70 WHOSE CHARACTEISTICS ARE SIMILAR TO THE SPECIFIED MODELS IF AND WHEN SUCH MODELS ENTER THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

M. IF LIMITS ON U.S. TANKS PROVE NECESSARY, SUCH LIMITS SHOULD BE RESTRICTED TO MAIN BATTLE TANKS WHICH WOULD BE DEFINED BY THOSE MODELS (E.G., M60, M60A1, M60A2) NOW IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIOS AND OTHER MODELS WITH SIMILAR CHARACTERISTICS IF AND WHEN SUCH MODELS ENTER THE AREA.

N. AS NEW MODELS OF U.S. AIRCRAFT AND SOVIET TANKS ARE INTRODUCED INTO THE NGA, A DIALOGUE MAY BE NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH WHICH OF THEM ARE "NUCLEAR CAPABLE AIRCRAFT MODELS"

AND WHICH OF THEM ARE " MAIN BATTLE TANKS." IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO AGREE ON SOME ARRANGEMENT FOR CARRYING OUT THIS DIALOGUE WHICH WILL ENSURE THAT IT WILL BE CONDUCTED BETWEEN THE ALLIANCES, RATHER THAN BILATERALLY. SINCE IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE ALLIES WILL WANT THIS SAME ARRANGEMENT TO APPLY TO WHATEVER DIALOGUE MAY PROVE NECESSARY ON SUCH SUBJECTS AS CIRCUMVENTION, VERIFICATION, AND STABILIZING MEASURES, THE ALLIES WILL NOT WISH TO RAISE THIS QUESTION WITH THE EAST UNTIL AFTER THEY HAVE FULLY DEVELOPED ALLIANCE POSITIONS ON THESE SUBJECTS. (SEE PARA 5L, REF C).

#### IV. AIR MANPOWER

O. (SEE PARA 5O, REF C). WITHIN THE OVERALL COMBINED AIR AND GROUND COMMON CEILING THERE WOULD BE A CEILING ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER WHICH WOULD BE ILLUSTRATIVELY SET AT 700,000.

P. THERE WOULD BE NO SUB-CEILING ON AIR FORCE MANPOWER WITHIN THE OVERALL COMBINED AIR AND GROUND COMMON CEILING.

Q. A NUMERICAL LIMITATION SHOULD BE PLACED ON TOTAL SOVIET MANPOWER AND ON SOVIET GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE  
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AREA OF REDUCTIONS AT A LEVEL EQUAL TO THE NUMBER IN THE AREA AT THE TIME OF THE CONCLUSION OF A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT. MINUS THE AGREED NUMBER OF SOVIET GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL TO BE REDUCED, WITH EXCEPTIONS FOR EXERCISES. THE ALLIES WOULD AGREE TO A LIMITATION ON TOTAL U.S. MANPOWER AND ON U.S. GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS AT A LEVEL EQUAL TO THE NUMBER IN THE AREA AT THE TIME OF THE CONCLUSION OF A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT, MINUS THE AGREED NUMBER OF U.S. GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL TO BE REDUCED, WITH EXCEPTIONS FOR EXERCISES. NO ADDITIONAL LIMITATION WOULD BE PLACED ON SOVIET OR U.S. AIR MANPOWER AS A RESULT OF PHASE I REDUCTIONS.

R. THE ALLIES MAY ULTIMATELY WANT TO PERMIT LIMITED U.S. AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS IN PHASE I TO ALLOW THE ALLIES TO TAKE "CREDIT" FOR U.S. AIRMAN WHO MAY BE WITHDRAWN WITH THE U.S. -F-4 AIRCRAFT IN OPTION III. THE ALLIES DO NOT WANT TO COMMIT THEMSELVES AT THIS TIME TO ANY AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS OR ENGAGE THE EAST ON THIS TOPIC UNTIL AFTER THEY HAVE RECEIVED A CONSIDERED EASTERN REACTION TO THE OPTION III PROPOSAL. IF ANY U.S. AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS ARE ULTIMATELY AGREED TO IN PHASE I THEY WOULD  
--BE ON A STRICTLY VOLUNTARY BASIS(MINIMIZING ANY PRECEDENT FOR PHASE II);

--BE LIMITED TO A SMALL PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL REDUCTIONS (SO AS TO MAINTAIN THE FOCUS ON GROUND FORCES REDUCTIONS);

--NOT REQUIRE A REDUCTION IN THE PRESENT LEVEL OF U.S.  
TACTICAL FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN THE AREA (EXCEPT FOR THE F-4S  
INCLUDED IN OPTION III).

S. AS PREVIOUSLY AGREED BY THE ALLIES, A TEMPORARY  
LIMITATION OF LIMITED DURATION WOULD BE PLACED ON THE OVERALL  
GROUND FORCE MANPOWER ON EACH SIDE IN THE AREA OF  
REDUCTIONS AT A LEVEL EQUAL TO THE NUMBER IN THE AREA AT THE  
TIME OF THE CONCLUSION OF THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT, MINUS  
THE AGREED NUMBERS OF THE U.S.M AND SOVIET PERSONNEL TO  
BE REDUCED. SIMILARLY A TEIMPORARY LIMITATION WOULD BE AGREED  
ON OVERALL AGGREGATE AIR AND GROUND FORCE MANPOWER ON EACH SIDE  
AS A REPLACEMENT FOR THE PREVIOUS ALLIED PROPOSAL TO TEMPORARILY LIMIT

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AIR MANPOWER. ALL LIMITATIONS PROPOSED SHOULD BE FORMULATED  
SO AS TO RESULT IN NO NATIONAL OR COLLECTIVE SUB-CEILINGS ON  
NON-U.S. NATO FORCES.

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